The recent migratory crisis in the Spanish exclave of Ceuta shows no signs of lessening and international public opinion appears to be divided on this subject: from the outrage at Spain still possessing colonies in Africa and calls for sympathy towards the innocent migrants, to the looming threat of a Moroccan invasion. For the sake of intellectual honesty, it behooves addressing some of those claims and shed some light on the most contentious issues.
Is Ceuta a colony?
The history of Ceuta commences three millennia ago, as a Phoenician settlement. Throughout antiquity and the early Middle Ages, the city fluctuated between Roman, Carthaginian, Byzantine, Vandal, and Visigoth control; always in the sphere of Roman-Christian influence and, often, politically linked to the peninsula. The Muslim invasion in the 8th century brought Ceuta into the orbit of Islam for seven centuries, although the original Christian and Romance-speaking population of the city was able to survive during these turbulent times. Portugal conquered Ceuta in 1415, thus bringing it back into the Western Christian world. And dynastic vicissitudes landed it definitively into the Spanish crown in 1578, where it has remained until present time.
Bearing in mind that the current State of Morocco dates from its independence from France in 1956—even being extremely generous, it could be traced back to the establishment of the current ruling Alawi dynasty in 1666—it is undeniable that Ceuta has never been part of Morocco. Perhaps the modern mind, imbued by a cartographical fetishism inherited from the Enlightenment, struggles with the concept of exclaves. One would wonder whether the same outrage is displayed at places like Alaska, Istanbul, Kaliningrad, or Gibraltar. The truth is that territorial discontinuity has always been a valid and accepted mode of political organization, and often quite successful. (Let us remember the Hanseatic League among others).
But, of course, nationhood—however nebulous a term it might be—cannot be solely defined by these positivist administrative or dynastic circumstances; it requires a more organic approach. During all these historical tribulations, Ceuta never lost its core of Christian Romance-speaking population. If we take a casual stroll about the streets of Ceuta, it will not feel very different from being in any other Andalusian city. Evidently, as any frontier city, it displays a certain degree of multiculturalism, and it contains a notable Muslim minority of Moroccan heritage. But even these citizens—accustomed to European standards of prosperity, welfare, and freedom—strongly reject the idea of Moroccan annexation.
Spain did indeed partake of the European colonization of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, adding Equatorial Guinea, Western Sahara, and parts of Morocco under its imperial belt. However, all these territories were granted their independence in the second half of the past century (or, in the case of Western Sahara, annexed by Morocco with US complicity). The case of Ceuta and Melilla is therefore completely different from the actual process of colonization that took place during the Scramble for Africa. These two cities are as Spanish as the Canary Islands, and as Spanish as Kaliningrad is Russian or Alaska is American.
Has Ceuta suffered an invasion?
We often see an invasion as an ostentatious military operation with the aim of territorial occupation. But an invasion could have other political goals such as economic gain, diplomatic pressure, civil unrest, or public opinion manipulation. Moreover, modern warfare avails of a much wider, ambiguous and subtle array of agents than it used to. Military historian Martin van Creveld argues in his book The Transformation of War that the traditional vision of war is becoming obsolete and new forms of warfare will become the norm in the modern world. In this new hybrid warfare, the utilization of civilians and migration fluxes as a method of coercion will become increasingly more commonplace.
Morocco is not strange to the use of civilians as a political weapon (beginning with the aforementioned Green March in 1975). Over the past decades, Morocco has used migration fluxes to castigate Spain at times of diplomatic tension. The latest notable example being the 2021 incident, when a wave of 8,000 migrants crossed illegally into Ceuta after a deterioration of diplomatic relations over the question of Western Sahara. Due to the bilateral agreement between the two countries to share border protection, Morocco has a permanent trump card to put pressure on Spain by relaxing control of both the Ceuta border and their southern border to allow the passage of sub-Saharan migrants.
Recent events might have displeased the Moroccan régime. A law to confer Spanish citizenship on Sahrawis who were born while still a Spanish colony is being discussed at present. The tense relationship between Spain and Israel over Palestine—Morocco being a faithful ally of the Israel-US axis. Or Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez visiting Algeria—Morocco’s principal geopolitical rival—to discuss a gas deal a mere fortnight before the border incident. Spain has been juggling this hot potato for decades, torn between its historical ties to Western Sahara and its need to maintain cordial diplomatic relations with both Morocco and Algeria.
Whatever the Spanish government did to aggrieve its Moroccan counterpart, the latter has deemed necessary to flex some geopolitical muscle and send an unequivocal warning. Police reports denounce indeed a palpable permissiveness—when not open connivence—of the Moroccan border security forces. This means that the events that took place in late July, insomuch as they were orchestrated by a hostile power with geopolitical motivations, can be classified as an operation of hybrid war. Ceuta has indeed suffered an invasion, irrespective of the innocence or awareness of the agents employed.
Is Morocco intending to de facto occupy Ceuta?
“Greater Morocco” is a nationalist concept popular in Morocco since its independence, which advocates for the annexation of what some believe to have been territories historically associated with the Moroccan sultan—Western Sahara, Mauritania, parts of Mali and Algeria, and the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Although not an official objective of the Moroccan government, it is a trope often invoked to inflame patriotic sentiment among Moroccans and to maintain Spain under a mild state of threat.
Having land borders with Spanish Ceuta and Melilla constitutes a clear asset for Morocco, as they offer a very convenient and quick way to European trade. Not to mention the political rewards that they can get from Spain by using immigration as a pressure tactic, such as substantial development aid. What consequences would actual annexation have? Some claim that Ceuta provides a crucial geostrategic position, but Morocco already has the Tanger Med, a large busy trading port located in a similar position at the Strait of Gibraltar. Also, one could easily surmise how most of the Spanish population of Ceuta would relocate on the peninsula, letting Ceuta become, gradually, a city with average Moroccan standards.
So a potential Moroccan annexation would leave Morocco with no substantial geostrategic gain, loss of lucrative trade with a prosperous European territory, and, most importantly, loss of the political cash cow that Morocco wisely milks through the means of border control. Therefore, and notwithstanding any bombastic rhetoric they might occasionally employ for psychological effect, these kinds of operations are aimed towards political threat rather than actual occupation.
What can be done to avoid this situation in future?
The European Union has long relied on externalization of border control to northern African countries. In exchange for economic support and other privileges, these countries vow to commit resources to the control of migration fluxes into Europe. This approach poses two fundamental risks: first, vulnerability to potential political instability (recall the migration crisis succeeding Gaddafi’s toppling), and, second, granting them the possibility of weaponizing migration as a political threat, as in the present case.
In light of that, one would have serious reservations in believing that Ceuta’s integration into higher structures of power—viz. the EU and the Spanish state—guarantees a better defense of its borders. The principle of subsidiarity is paramount here, since no one better than the Ceutíes knows how to manage their borders, immigration rules and potential crises. Therefore, a higher degree of autonomy for Ceuta would result in a more efficient immigration management and would reduce the incidence of tragic events. Immigration is a phenomenon that can be positive or negative, but it ought not to be imposed on a community. Everyone has freedom of movement but also property rights, and the latter trumps the former.
Conclusion
However this crisis is solved, and whatever news are spread in the interim, some salient points are to be born in mind:
- Ceuta is not a colony, but a Spanish city by historical, cultural and legal rights;
- Ceuta has suffered an invasion within a scenario of hybrid war;
- It is unlikely that, despite its imperialistic rhetoric, Morocco intends to effectively annex Ceuta;
- More autonomy to Ceuta in immigration management could bring an improvement from the failed policies of both the Spanish government and the EU
